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1.  Introduction 
The position of Muslims in Western societies is the subject of intense study and debate 
(Modood 1998). In particular, multiculturalism as both policy and concept has come 
under attack (Joppke 2004), though there have been attempts to defend – and reformulate 
– it (Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). At the same time there is increasing recognition of the 
economic disadvantage experienced by Muslims in many European countries (Ansari 
2002; Platt 2007; Vasta 2007). However, while Islam is regarded as an obstacle to 
incorporation within European societies, little attention has been paid to the religious 
practice of European Muslim immigrants and their descendants and to how Muslim 
religiosity relates to conventional measures of social and economic integration. Phalet 
and Haker 2004; and Maliepaard et al. 2010 provide exceptions for the Netherlands. This 
contrasts with the strong US tradition of analysing religious practice as a route to 
integration for immigrants and their children (Foner and Alba 2008).  
 Current debates about Muslims in Europe are typically underpinned – 
implicitly or explicitly – by a universalising frame of reference that assumes transnational 
continuity in religious beliefs and practices, and their correlates. However, the extent to 
which such assumptions are valid and are a persistent phenomenon of Muslim identity 
and practice requires interrogation in more than one national context and ideally at 
periods both prior to and subsequent to the recent debates surrounding multiculturalism. 
In this paper, therefore, we investigate Muslim religiosity in the 1990s, exploring 
similarities and differences in the correlates of religiosity in different national contexts, 
and in the period before 2001 and the enhanced politicisation of the discourse surround 
Islam that has marked the 21st century. Specifically, we investigate attendance at religious 
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meetings in two increasingly secular societies, the UK and the Netherlands. These two 
countries are both comparable and distinct and allow for investigation of differentiation 
(Foner and Alba 2008; Kelly and De Graaf 1997). By detailed case study comparison we 
can explore which secularising processes impact different Muslim populations, and 
whether differences in national context or national origin of Muslims remain pertinent to 
a consideration of Muslim religiosity. We draw on theories of secularization, 
assimilation, revitalization and integration, to identify potential correlates of religiosity.  
 
2.  Background and key concepts  
We frame our discussion and analysis in relation to theories of secularization (Durkheim 
1995 [1912]; Berger 1967; Norris and Inglehart 2004), assimilation (Park and Burgess 
1969 [1921]; Gordon 1964) revitalization (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Statham 2004; 
Jacobsen 1997), and integration (Durkheim 1963 [1897]) and identity (Tajfel 1981). We 
use the term revitalisation to refer to both the institutionalisation of religious practice 
within country of migration, through, for example the construction of mosques and the 
provision of religious education, and to re-Islamization (Laurence and Vaisse 2006), or 
the assertion of overarching transnational religious identities, often replacing strong 
ethnic affiliation among the second generation of minorities (Alam and Husband 2006).  
Between them, these theories imply a role for educational and economic 
attainment, length of time in the destination country, generation, majority exposure and 
identification for the intensity of religious practice in highly secular societies.  
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Secularization: the role of education and economic security 
The founders of sociology claimed that not only the belief in religion among people but 
also the central role of religious institutions would decrease as economic security 
increased and the state took on the functions of religious institutions (Durkheim 1995 
[1912]). At the same time, standard theories based on enlightenment perspectives have 
suggested that with education people learn to see religions as forms of superstition 
(Weber 1930 [1904]; Berger 1967). This view of the gradual disappearance of religion 
through security and education has dominated the sociological debate on religion in the 
20th century. The tenets of secularism have more recently been subject to re-evaluation 
(Smith 2008), but it is clear that affiliation and traditional forms of observance are on the 
decline in Western European countries. 
We might anticipate, therefore, that both the acquisition of qualifications and 
economic security would lead towards a decline in religiosity for Muslim minorities 
faced with life in a secular society, as Kelly and De Graaf 1997 have found. However, it 
is helpful to distinguish education as personal learning or exposure to ideas, from 
educational contexts as providing contact or exposure to secular individuals.  
Education as a form of contact with non-religious, secular individuals or those of 
another religious affiliation may challenge beliefs or lead to convergence. General 
integration theory proposes that the more people integrate in social groups the more 
likely they are to follow the rules of these groups (Durkheim 1963 [1897]). In educational 
institutions, such ‘integration’ depends on whether individuals are enabled to foster their 
religious identity, and the extent to which that is congruent with academic success. 
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Participation in schooling among the second generation is  a reflection of such potential 
contact, but may vary according to the national structure of educational institutions. 
Education can also lead to greater understanding and intellectual commitment to 
one’s religion. Contrary to stereotypes, education may not be regarded as a threat to faith: 
for example there has been a rapid expansion in the number of women from Muslim 
families in the UK entering higher education (Georgiadis and Manning forthcoming; 
Hussain and Bagguley 2007); and there is substantial evidence of the positive relationship 
between religious observance and educational attainment (Lehrer 2008) as well as on the 
increased income associated with religiosity in high income countries (Bettendorf and 
Dijkgraaf 2007; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Even as secularization would suggest a 
negative relationship between qualifications and religiosity, the story may be more 
complex.  
Related to the concept of education as insight leading to rejection of religious 
attachment, Muslims with good host country language proficiency are more likely to 
come in contact with secular worldviews in the destination society. Indeed, host language 
fluency may both be a precondition for adopting a more secular outlook and, conversely, 
may be less necessary to those who are embedded in ethnically specific religious 
practices and institutions. 
Socio-economic position also may impact on religiosity both via social contact as 
well as via the security it offers. Labour market participation typically involves contact 
with majority society members, and has also been seen as representing a measure of 
engagement with or integration into the host society. According to Logan and Alba 
(1993), labour market integration is likely to lead to similar levels of secularisation to 
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non-immigrant counterparts. Conversely, the low participation rates of Muslim women 
have been related to religious norms and proscriptions, though there is some evidence of 
change across generations (Dale et al. 2006; Georgiadis and Manning forthcoming). 
However, such a notion of the ‘well-integrated’ being less secular is open to contestation. 
Ethnic attachment does not necessarily decline with resources; in fact greater economic 
assimilation will increase the relative power and position of minority groups and allow 
them more choices, including the choice to associate with those felt to be similar (Dorsett 
1998). On the other hand, religion and religious institutions can act as a ‘resource’ in 
times of difficulty and therefore may be most important to those who are not in work and 
with lower levels of income.  
 
Assimilation and re-Islamization: religious expression over time and in the second 
generation 
For assimilation theories time is a crucial factor: as immigrants spend longer in a country, 
they are assumed to be more likely to take on board the values, norms and expectations of 
their country of residence (Gordon 1964). This would suggest that Muslims entering a 
secular country would be more likely to become secular themselves over time and across 
generations. However, the functions of religious participation, in terms of providing 
meaning in adversity and community support may in fact become more important over 
time, and the passage of time can allow greater institutionalisation of religious practices 
and settings. There is also increasing recognition that for second and subsequent 
generations, Islam can offer a meaningful source of identification for those at odds 
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between the homeland identification of their parents and their exclusion within their 
country of birth (Statham 2004, Alam and Husband 2006). 
Moreover, it is important to recognise that even apparently secular Western states 
are often imbued with specific religious symbolism, assumptions and privileges (Foner 
and Alba 2008). Convergence therefore represents not the gradual abandonment of a 
particular belief system, but by implication the tacit acceptance of an alternative one. In 
the face of such a ‘choice’ more powerful adherence to religion of birth and upbringing 
over time and into the second generation starts to seem more likely.  
 
Integration: religion as a resource and intergroup relations 
Religious identification can be regarded as a resource, where identity is used to pursue 
interests (Barth 2010). At the same time ascription to particular identity categories can 
inform behaviour and group attachment (Tajfel 1981). While there have been challenges 
to the concept of 'identity' and the meaning of 'ethnic group' within social science 
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000, Carter and Fenton 2010), identification and sense of in-
group belonging is recognised as being both consequential for well-being (Thoits 1983) 
and contributing to understanding of inter-group relations, however loosely the term 
group is conceived (Jenkins 2008). While much of the discussion of identity has focused 
on ethnic identification, the pertinence of religious identities is increasingly being 
recognised as significant for our understanding of social identity (Ysseldyk et al 2010) 
and its consequences (Modood 2010), as well as inter-group relations (Verkuyten 2005). 
At the same time, the nature of overlapping social identities (Roccas and Brewer 2002), 
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in particular ethnic and religious identities, are drawing increasing empirical and 
conceptual attention in Western Europe.  
  Religious identification and accordance with norms associated with that identity 
can therefore both stem from patterns of social contact and engagement and contribute to 
shaping them. Thus we would expect to see greater religiosity paralleled by both greater 
in-group identification and by other demonstrations of group related behaviour, such as 
greater in group and less out group contact. This latter also accords with the more general 
expression of integration theory (Durkheim 1963 [1897]), whereby greater in-group 
contact is likely to be associated with greater religiosity and greater out-group contact to 
be associated with lower religiosity.  
 Moreover, ethnically based association and clubs build community resources and 
create opportunities for integration (Putnam, 1995; Portes, Fernández-Kelly and Haller 
2005; Zhou and Xiong 2005). Their function as a resource can be particularly important 
in less receptive contexts (Connor 2010). Such associations often have their basis in 
organised religious activities and therefore involvement in them implies greater levels of 
attendance at religious meetings. Conversely, involvement in interethnic associations 
may offer a substitute to association based on religious practice. Social identities 
conceived in terms of interest, following Barth (1969), may thus link patterns of 
association with religiosity. 
Finally, the geographical concentration of groups has been linked to group-related 
preferences or the enforcement of group norms. Exclusion and self-separation are debated 
in literatures on ethnic enclaves (Borjas 1998; Clark and Drinkwater 2002; Cutler and 
Glaeser 1997), ‘oppositional identities’ (Battu et al. 2005), and the marginalization of 
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minorities in general and Muslims in particular (Ansari 2002; Platt 2007; Vasta 2007). 
Whether the emphasis is on allocation or on preferences, neighbourhood concentration is 
likely to be consequential for behaviour, with concentrations of residents of the same 
minority faith or religious identity associated with greater religious participation. 
Furthermore, people tend to establish their religious institutions and social contacts in 
places where their religious groups are concentrated (Ebaugh, O’Brien and Chafetz 
2000), facilitating access in such areas. Ethnic concentration seems to be more powerful 
than specifically religious concentration in fostering shared association (Peach 2006); but 
given the substantial overlap between religious and ethnic identities for both the UK’s 
and the Netherlands’ largest Muslim minorities, the level of concentration of Muslim 
minorities’ own ethnic group can be expected to play a part in reinforcing Muslim 
religious involvement (Van Tubergen 2007). 
  
The importance of context – origin and destination factors 
The majority of Muslims in Europe are either immigrants or the children of immigrants 
who have typically emigrated from countries where Islam is the majority religion and 
where participation in religious activities is higher than in the destination countries. 
However, within this general pattern there is great diversity in terms of both origin 
societies and destination countries. 
We therefore explore two broadly comparable but nevertheless distinct 
‘destination’ contexts and examine the contribution of ethnic origins. These ethnicities 
reflect complex histories of migration, and settlement as well as diverse historical and 
cultural heritages with different religious interpretations and practices. Muslims in Britain 
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mostly originate from the South Asian countries, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, while 
Muslims in the Netherlands predominantly came from Turkey and Morocco.1  
Drawing on Norris and Inglehart (2004) and their axioms for levels of religious 
adherence, we would expect religiosity to be affected by the degree of development of 
the origin country, whether it is primarily agrarian or industrial and whether it is 
religiously plural. On this basis, to what extent are Muslims in our study likely to differ 
from one another in terms of their religiosity? Turning first to the Netherlands, Turkey is 
an industrial nation while Morocco, Suriname and the Antilles are agrarian societies. In 
terms of religiosity, Turkey and Morocco are predominantly Islamic societies while 
Suriname has a mix of Hindu, Protestant, Catholic and Islamic heritage and the Antilles 
have a predominantly Christian culture. The UK’s Muslims are predominantly Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi, though Indian Muslims (from both India and East Africa) make up a 
sizeable share. Both Pakistan and especially Bangladesh are agrarian societies and they 
are both Islamic societies. Indian Muslims from East Africa were a primarily urban 
minority, and Muslims are a (substantial) religious minority in India. In line with Norris 
and Inglehart (2004), we might therefore expect that Moroccans attend religious meetings 
more often than Turks and Surinamese in the Netherlands while Bangladeshis and 
Pakistanis would show more religious observance than Indians and African Asian in the 
UK.  
When we turn to compare the two destination countries, both countries are 
predominantly protestant; but in the UK state and church are merged whereas in the 
Netherlands there is a principle of pillarization, enabling the separate development of 
religious community institutions. In both countries there are multicultural agendas; but 
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differently played out. In the UK, these mostly revolved around ‘race’ and minority 
status. Until recently, religions were only covered by anti-discrimination legislation if 
they could be shown to be ethno-cultural entities – so, through case law Jews and Sikhs 
came to be covered but not Muslims. Muslims were also not covered by blasphemy laws. 
Equalities legislation now explicitly covers religion but that development postdates the 
period of our study. 
In the Netherlands the multicultural project extended to religion from the start: 
Muslims organized themselves within the tradition of pillarization. Its success, however, 
has been contested. Critics later argued that it encouraged a separatist approach and did 
not foster ‘integration’ (Landman 2002); while others have highlighted the ways in which 
it did little to address the marginalised situation of Dutch Muslims (Vasta 2007). 
In line with Inglehart’s theory, these factors would suggest a greater tendency 
towards secularization for Muslims in the Netherlands compared to Muslims in the UK. 
While we cannot make a direct comparison between the two countries relating to the 
extent of religiosity, these contextual factors are likely to influence the ways in which 
economic, educational, integration and identification factors play out in the two settings.  
  
3.  Data, variables and methods 
Data 
For the Netherlands, we use the Social Position and Provision Ethnic Minorities Surveys 
(SPVA) collected in 1998 (N = 7553) (Martens 1999). The SPVA-survey includes the 
four largest ethnic minority groups - Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans - in 
the Netherlands, based on the citizenship or country of birth of the respondent. The 
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sampling focused on those conurbations where the majority of minorities live, allows the 
survey to cover 80 per cent of the minority groups, and the representation has been 
validated against national statistics (Martens 1999). Within the municipalities that form 
the basis of the sample, selection for the survey is random.  
 For the UK, we use the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (FNSEM) 
1993 (Modood et al. 1997). The survey comprises a sample of ethnic minorities selected 
across areas of high (>10%), medium (0.5%-10%) and low (<0.5%) minority group 
density and covers Indians, African Asians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Black Caribbeans 
and Chinese as well as a comparison sample of the White majority. Weights were 
calculated to adjust for the sample design and to enable the results to be representative of 
minorities in England and Wales. We have employed these weights in all analyses. The 
questionnaire was split to increase the content covered across the sample, so that while a 
question on religion was asked of all and allows us to identify around 2000 Muslims in 
the sample, religious practice, which includes our measure of religiosity was only asked 
of half the respondents to the survey. 
The designs of the surveys for both countries focus on areas of high ethnic 
minority concentration and aim to be representative; and information on religion is highly 
comparable. In both cases we are able to analyse patterns of religiosity and their 
correlates in a period before 2001. We use the SPVA from 1998 because it is the first 
survey in the Netherlands that contains information on religion and is closest to the date 
of the British survey. In both surveys we selected only those who reported themselves to 
be Muslim. Furthermore, we have excluded the small numbers of Muslim respondents 
from the ethnic majority group. We are therefore left with a total of around 2,300 
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Antilleans, Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans in the Dutch data, and around 950 
Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Indians and East African Asians in the UK data.  
 
Dependent variable 
Our key dependent variable is attendance at mosques and religious meetings, which is 
asked in a very similar way in both surveys: ‘how often do you attend religious 
meetings?’ In the Dutch survey, the answer categories were 0) ‘never’, 1) ‘a few times in 
a year’, 2) ‘a few times in a month’ and 3) ‘once or more a week’. The British question 
has one more category ‘less than once a year’. We dichotomised these variables into 1) 
once or more a week and 0) else. The use of a measure of weekly attendance for cross-
national studies is well-attested in existing studies (Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; van 
Tubergen 2006). The distributions across the response categories nevertheless vary 
somewhat between the countries, as can be seen from the Appendix table, which also 
includes descriptives for our other variables.  
 
Education and labour market participation 
We harmonised education into five categories of ‘no qualification’, ‘primary / basic’, 
‘secondary/O-level’, ‘A-level’, and ‘higher education’. We measured language skills with 
the question from the SPVA: ‘do you have difficulties in speaking Dutch?’, where the 
answer categories are 0) mostly, 1) sometimes and 2) never. We took category 2 to 
represent fluency in Dutch. In the UK data, English speaking skills were evaluated by the 
interviewer, and we created a comparable category of speaking English fluently. We 
included a dummy variable for whether employed.2 
 14 
  
Second generation and duration in destination country 
We include a dummy variable representing second generation which covers those who 
were born in the UK/NL or who migrated when younger than seven. We operationalise 
duration as current age minus age on migration.  
 
Interethnic contact  
We use a measure of membership of (NL) or activity in (UK) an association: 1) no 
membership of / not active in an association; 2) membership of / active in an ethnic 
association, and 3) membership of / active in a predominantly majority association.  
In the SPVA, the respondents could either identify with their own ethnic group or 
with being Dutch. However, in the British survey respondents were asked separately 
about their identification with being British and with their own group. Both of these 
identification scales are included in the British models.  
To characterise the local neighbourhood we use the percentage of own ethnic 
group in the respondents’ postcode area (Dutch data) or ward (UK data). The UK 
included this measure in the data set, but the Dutch data only included the postcode of the 
respondents. We therefore manually collected and matched in the percentage of own 
group living in that postcode for 1998 or the nearest year.3 This provides us with a small 
area measure of concentration; and, since minorities are strongly geographically 
concentrated in the Netherlands at the small area level, the average proportion of own 
group is relatively high. To avoid underestimating the standard errors for the relationship 
between geographical concentration and our dependent variable (Moulton 1990), in our 
 15 
analysis we allow for correlations between errors at the postcode level. The UK data 
provided the information in seven categories rather than exact percentages, ranking from 
0 to more than 33 per cent. We therefore took the midpoint of each category and 
constructed a linear variable. We do not know the actual neighbourhood of each 
observation, so to ensure that we do overestimate the statistical significance relating to 
the impact of area concentration, we allowed errors to be correlated across all those with 
a similar level of own group concentration. This provides a conservative estimate of the 
relationship between area concentration and religiosity. 
 
Origin country 
The Dutch data cover Moroccans, Turks, and an amalgamated category of 
Surinamese/Antilleans, while the British data contain Indians / East African Asians, 
Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis.  
 
Demographic factors 
We control for sex, age and partnership, which are typically associated with religious 
activity. Research shows that women tend to be more religious than men (De Vaus and 
McAllister 1987; Becker and Hofmeister 2001). However, Muslim women do not 
typically attend Friday prayers in the mosque. Studies of religiosity using a similar 
dependent variable have highlighted the finding that women attend less frequently (Van 
Tubergen 2006). It is therefore important to control for sex. There is nevertheless a 
distribution of responses for both men and women across the categories, which supports a 
pooled model. For example, in the UK data around half of the women attend at least 
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weekly. For robustness we also estimated models on men only. Although smaller sample 
sizes rendered it harder to attain statistical significance, the results were largely consistent 
in size and direction with those presented here from the pooled model. (Tables available 
from authors on request.) 
In cross-sectional surveys, it is problematic to disentangle cohort, period and age 
effects. In fact, those studies which have been able to separate the effects of age from 
those of cohort do not find aging influences religiosity (Tilley 2003; Crockett and Voas 
2006; Norris and Inglehart 2004). We control for age as an important demographic 
characteristic, but recognise that we cannot distinguish it from cohort; and it is potentially 
confounded with duration. 
 
Method  
We estimated logistic regression models. We estimated six models for each country to 
separately identify the different sets of potential associations, including a basic model 
which includes only sex, age and partnership status, and a seventh model that includes the 
full set of independent variables. 
 
4.  Results 
The Netherlands  
The first model of Table I is our baseline model which includes basic demographic data 
on sex, age and partnership status. Women are less likely to attend regularly than men. 
This is a specific feature of Muslim public religious participation (see also Van Tubergen 
2006). Those with a partner are also more likely to attend, consistent with existing 
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research (Becker and Hofmeister 2001). Age is associated with increased attendance. We 
explored whether there was any evidence for a non-linear relationship between age and 
attendance, but found no support for such a relationship. All three basic demographic 
factors persist across all models including other variables and in the full model.  
In Models 2 and 3, we estimate the relationship between educational and 
economic indicators and religious attendance, thus testing hypotheses relating to 
secularization and security. Being educated is associated with a lower propensity to 
attend, in line with the standard secularisation thesis, and there is some indication that 
this effect increases with educational level. Religious attendance among Muslims with 
good language skills is significantly lower than among those with poor Dutch language 
skills, according with the hypothesis that competence in Dutch is a precondition for 
absorbing a more secular worldview and conversely more necessary for those who are 
less religious, who will have more incentive to draw on alternative forms of social 
support and contact. Consistent with theories relating to both security and contact, and 
the potential of religious institutions as a resource, Muslims with a paid job attend 
religious meetings less often than unemployed Muslims (Model 3). All these effects 
persist in the final model. 
 
[Table I about here] 
 
Our discussion indicated that longer duration would be associated with assimilative 
processes and therefore lower attendance, especially for those socialised from an early 
age into Dutch society. However, we also discussed the view that revitalization and the 
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substitution of religious for more narrowly ‘ethnic’ identities could be associated with 
higher levels of attendance among the second generation. In fact, in Model 4, we find no 
support for either assimilation over time or for a second generation effect, once we have 
taken age into account. Younger minority group Muslims are less likely to attend, but that 
is the case regardless of generation. Being born or brought up in the Netherlands, over 
and above its potential for increasing probability of Dutch fluency, does not of itself 
enhance the tendency to assimilate to secular norms. Interacting ethnic group with 
duration (not illustrated) we found that there is a slight, but significant, tendency for 
Moroccan attendance to increase with duration, once we have controlled for age, 
suggesting that those groups with fewer infrastructural resources require time to establish 
the institutional arrangements to enable attendance. For Turks the probability of 
attendance remained constant with duration. Therefore even for particular groups, there is 
no evidence of assimilation; though it may be our cross-sectional data disguises cohort 
differences with earlier, more religious cohorts converging to the levels of later less 
religious ones. Without longitudinal data, this must remain at the level of conjecture, 
however.  
Forms of contact with the majority and identification with the majority were 
anticipated to reduce Muslim religiosity; and such integrative effects are partly found in 
the fifth model. It is worth noting the strong negative correlation between Dutch 
identification and attendance. This would appear to suggest that Muslim piety and 
Dutchness are in some ways at odds, as is often posited in current debates. We return to 
this issue when exploring the UK results, below. Interestingly, however, there is no 
evidence that living in a neighbourhood with a higher concentration of own group is 
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associated with greater religious attendance. It is worth noting that, unlike previous 
studies, we have used a measure of own group in the locality rather than simply the 
concentration of “non-Western” individuals. Our measure is clearly more relevant for 
hypotheses relating to group norms and contact. For the Netherlands at least, Muslim 
religiosity would not appear to be structured by local opportunities or group norms.  
Finally, origin effects partly accord with our expectations deriving from Norris 
and Inglehart’s classification of societies (Model 6), since Surinamese and Antilleans 
who come from countries with minority Muslim populations attend less frequently. But 
Turks, despite coming from an industrial country, attend significantly more frequently 
than the reference category of Moroccans. We speculated that there were two possible 
reasons for this apparently surprising outcome. First, the greater capacity among Turks to 
develop group level institutions and resources may encourage and support attendance 
Canatan (2001). This is supported by analysis exploring the interaction of duration with 
ethnicity, discussed above, which shows that Moroccan attendance increases with 
duration, whereas Turkish attendance rates remain largely constant. Second, and 
potentially related to the issue of institutional structures, we identified that greater 
attendance among Turks was largely driven by differences between Turkish and 
Moroccan women, with insignificant differences between Turkish and Moroccan men. 
The fact that Turks are, contrary to our hypothesis, no less likely to attend, may accord 
with the institutional infrastructure, while the greater attendance of Turkish women may 
be influenced both by infrastructure which facilitates their attendance and by origin 
country differences in gendered patterns of attendance that work in the opposite direction 
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to the industrialisation thesis. Future research with more origin countries and more 
extended measures of institutional provision may help to illuminate this question. 
 
The United Kingdom 
Table II shows that the UK reveals a rather different set of associations. While the 
smaller sample size reduces the chances of achieving statistical significance in some 
cases, an inspection of the sign and size of the coefficients show that there are differences 
between the two countries. Model 1 shows that, as with the Netherlands, being a woman 
is negatively associated with attendance, while age is positively associated and being 
partnered is positively though not significantly associated. In Model 2, we see that 
education is not clearly associated with attendance, as it was for Dutch Muslims. Closer 
inspection shows that part of any education effect comes through greater English 
language fluency (and thereby also partly by generation). The sign for some of the 
education dummies is in the expected direction and further aggregation could produce 
some significant differences in the reduced model, but overall, the secularising power of 
education for UK Muslims, over and above these exposure effects does not seem clear 
cut as it does for Dutch Muslims. Fluency in English is also associated with lower 
attendance, as Dutch fluency was for the Netherlands. This again emphsises the ways in 
which competence in English may be a precondition for absorbing a more secular world 
view and also be more necessary for those who are less religious.  Economic security as 
measured by employment (Model 3) is again negatively but not significantly associated 
with attendance, and this association is weakened further in the full model, thus providing 
only limited support the relevance of security in the secularising process. Overall, then 
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the UK does not provide strong support for process of secularisation operating among 
British Muslims in the ways they do for Dutch Muslims. 
 
[Table II about here] 
 
Similarly, assimilation in terms of duration of stay (Model 4) is not associated with either 
greater or lesser religiosity, once age is taken into account; and in this model the age 
coefficient itself becomes non-significant. However, being second generation is highly 
significantly related to decreased attendance. Unlike in the Dutch data, where being 
second generation was only relevant in so far as it was associated with youth, either via 
an age or perhaps more probably a cohort effect (Crockett and Voas 2006), in the UK 
second generation and the implied greater assimilation to more secular norms stemming 
from that is significant in its own right.  
 This indicates that religiosity is sensitive to local conditions and exposure and that 
is also supported by the integration model.  Being active in an own group association is 
not significant in the simple model, but it becomes so in the final model when we control 
for other relevant factors. Test also confirm that participation in an own ethnic group 
organisation differences significantly from the effect of belonging to a majority 
organisation, relative to no organisation. The association between ethnicity and 
association may well imply reverse causation since religious participation and attendance 
facilitates organisational involvement (Ruiter and de Graaf 2006), but could also relate to 
mutually reinforcing group norms. Unlike in the Netherlands, the increased group norms 
or resources implied by own group area concentration have a positive relationship with 
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religiosity, and this association persists in the final model. Again we may be seeing 
reverse causation, in that religious people may choose to co-reside in places where they 
have access to religious institutions. More important, for our purposes, however, is the 
fact that this association is found here but not in the Netherlands, despite – or perhaps 
because of – the high degree of ethnic group concentration in the Netherlands.  
A particularly striking finding for the UK is the positive relation between self-
identification with British society and religious attendance, which remains in the full 
model. This is at odds with our expectations relating to integration and contrasts with the 
Dutch results. It is perhaps particularly worthy of note given that in the UK, by the date 
of our data, the Rushdie affair had already politicised perceptions of British Muslims and 
reshaped debates on ethnicity and integration within the UK (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; 
Modood 2009). This association between British identification and higher rates of 
attendance is robust to the inclusion of identification with own ethnic group, which is 
also positive, in line with expectations. Thus, it is not simply that those more attached 
generally who are more religious, but among those with different levels of own group 
attachment British identity is still associated with greater religiosity. Despite debates 
about ‘oppositional’ cultures (Battu et al. 2005), religious practice in the UK would 
appear to have an integrative role in terms of destination country identification. Put 
otherwise, strong national identification is not felt to be at odds with devout religious 
practice (cf. Manning and Roy 2010).  It may be that we are seeing the integrative role of 
religious institutions themselves, which can foster more general feelings of belonging and 
associated self-confidence (Foner and Alba 2008; Furbey et al. 2006). 
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Finally, Bangladeshis are significantly more likely to attend regularly than 
Pakistanis (Model 6). This is in line with our expectations concerning level of 
industrialisation in the origin country.  
In the Netherlands, then, there would appear to be indications of some 
secularising tendencies within patterns of Muslim religiosity, and conversely little 
evidence of revitalisation. While in the UK there is far less support for secularisation as a 
general process but exposure and contact seem much more pertinent to levels of 
attendance, though, as in the Netherlands, duration among the first generation is not 
associated with declining religiosity. Two particularly distinctive and contrasting features 
across the two countries relate to assimilation and integration arguments. In the 
Netherlands there was no specific second generation association that would imply a 
specific impact of upbringing and schooling (regardless of qualifications) on religious 
behaviour. By contrast, in the UK the second generation were significantly less likely to 
attend regularly, even after controlling for age, suggesting that upbringing – perhaps 
though greater contact with non-Muslims in school – matters. In the UK, British 
identification was positively correlated with attendance, while in the Netherlands Dutch 
identification was negatively correlated. These differences could tell us something about 
the distinctiveness of the different institutional settings and reception of Muslims in the 
two countries. For example, pillarization could help to account for the lack of a second 
generation effect in the Netherlands. However, equally important as differences in 
national context could be the differences in the ethnic origins of Muslims in the two 
countries.  
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Clearly we cannot present a counterfactual of the religious behaviour of 
Moroccan Muslims in the UK or Bangladeshi Muslims in the Netherlands, which might 
isolate ethnic origins from institutional effects, but given the differences between ethnic 
groups within each country we explored further the extent to which some of these key 
features were ethnically specific within each country, by estimating models with 
interactions between ethnicity and these apparently counter-intuitive associations, namely 
for the Netherlands, second generation, and for the UK British identity. (Tables available 
from authors on request.) However, these models resulted in no statistically significant 
differential probabilities for the interactions.  
  
5. Conclusions 
There is increasing scholarly interest on the experience and practice of Muslims in 
European countries (Phalet and Haker 2004; Maliepaard 2010; Conner 2010). Our work 
contributes to these by a specific investigation – and comparison – of the factors 
associated with Muslim religiosity, in two rich Western countries in the period before 
2001. Single country studies provide a rich understanding of the Muslim patterns of 
attendance and the factors that shape them, yet they implicitly suggest a continuity of 
experience across Muslims of different origins and in different settings (e.g. Phalet and 
Haker 2004; Maliepaard 2010), enhanced in a period in which the strong politicisation of 
discourses surround Muslims tend to assume cross-national continuities. Conversely, 
multiple-country studies can legitimately claim a greater degree of generalisation, but 
may obscure the specifics and complexities of correlates of Muslim religiosity as they are 
played out in particular national contexts (Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009) or may not 
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have the scope to address minority religions in the countries considered (e.g. Kelley and 
De Graaf 1997). A case study approach, such as that pursued here, can retain some of the 
richness of analysis and interpretation of the single country studies, while highlighting 
the extent to which findings and theoretical frameworks of explanation can or cannot be 
applied consistently across more than one setting.  
 Such an approach does not come without its difficulties in terms of harmonisation 
of data sources and of disentangling institutional impacts across the two countries from 
the differences in countries of origin of their Muslim groups, and these limitations clearly 
lead to caution in extrapolating from the results presented here. Yet the insights are 
potentially valuable in highlighting diversity and similarity among Muslims of different 
backgrounds and in different institutional contexts and in providing an agenda for future 
research.  
Moreover, our findings help to highlight the extent to which the questions asked 
in different national contexts are premised on particular assumptions processes of 
integration and ethnic attachment. Thus, the question on Dutch identity required people to 
position themselves as either Dutch or as of minority ethnicity, and an inspection of the 
Dutch results alone might have led to the inference that greater religiosity fosters lower 
Dutch identification and by extension to an assumption that religious Muslims were 
somewhat alienated from the host society. However, the question itself fails to recognise 
that own group and majority group attachments represent different dimensions of identity 
rather than two ends of a single pole, and operate in different ways in relation to host 
country interaction, as Schaafsma et al (2010) have recently shown.  When we turn to the 
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British data we see these different dimensions in the joint association of ethnic identity 
and British identity with greater religiosity.  
The Netherlands results provide some support for secularisation as a common 
process affecting minority Muslims in Western societies as well as the majority members 
of those societies themselves. There is much less support for such processes operating 
among British Muslims, and the differential role of education and security are worthy of 
further scrutiny. Neither country provides evidence of processes of revitalisation, though 
it is interesting that the exposure to the host country implied by longer duration does not 
have an impact over and above that of age (for the Netherlands) or generation (for the 
UK), which refutes assimilation expectations. The two countries provide only partial 
evidence (in the form of ethnic associational participation and, in the UK, area 
concentration) for the assumed association between integration and weaker religious 
attachment that underpins much of the current heated debate about the extent to which 
Muslims ‘fit’ within Western democracies (Vasta 2007). Moreover, the UK evidence 
presented here challenges us to rethink the finding from the Netherlands that implies an 
inherent contradiction between Muslim affiliation and destination country national 
identification (see also Manning and Roy 2010, Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).  
Overall, our study has indicated that the answers to questions about factors 
shaping religiosity can be highly context specific, and say as much about the national 
settings within which Muslims practice and their own histories and origins, as about the 
determinants of religious practice themselves.  
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Notes 
1.  These cover the major Muslim groups in Europe by country of origin.  
2.  We also tested whether annual household income is related to attendance in the 
two countries. There are a large number of missing values on income which 
reduces sample size. We also replaced the missing values by imputing these 
values or using the mean of household income. None of the versions revealed 
significant association with attendance. We did not include income in our final 
specification.  
3. We gathered this information from the website for statistics on municipalities in 
the Netherlands (www.incijfers.nl) or from the research centres of the city 
councils. 
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Table I: Binary Logistic Regressions of Weekly Attendance: Netherlands 1998 
 Basic Secularisati
on 
Security Assimilation Integration Ethnic 
origins 
Full 
Women -1.10*** -1.13*** -1.24*** -1.06*** -1.07*** -1.03*** -1.11*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) 
Partner 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
Age 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
No qualification  Ref.      Ref.  
Basic  -0.18     -0.19 
  (0.12)     (0.13) 
Secondary  -0.49***     -0.52** 
  (0.15)     (0.17) 
A level  -0.50*     -0.49* 
  (0.20)     (0.23) 
University  -0.94***     -0.78** 
  (0.24)     (0.25) 
Fluent in Dutch  -0.43***     -0.30* 
  (0.11)     (0.14) 
Employed   -0.47***    -0.30* 
   (0.10)    (0.12) 
2nd generation    -0.16   -0.01 
    (0.22)   (0.27) 
Duration of stay    0.01   0.01 
    (0.01)   (0.01) 
Dutch identity     -0.94***  -0.74* 
     (0.28)  (0.31) 
No association     Ref.   Ref.  
Ethnic 
association 
    0.41**  0.56*** 
     (0.15)  (0.17) 
Majority 
association 
    -0.14  0.19 
     (0.22)  (0.23) 
Own group area      0.00  -0.00 
     (0.00)  (0.00) 
Moroccan      Ref.  Ref.  
Turkish      0.21* 0.19 
      (0.10) (0.13) 
Surinamese      -1.21*** -0.85** 
      (0.23) (0.27) 
Constant -2.40*** -1.61*** -1.89*** -2.30*** -2.47*** -2.58*** -1.50*** 
 (0.18) (0.24) (0.21) (0.20) (0.23) (0.19) (0.29) 
pseudo R2 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.17 
Log likelihood -1411 -1327 -1398 -1372 -1384 -1389 -1259 
N 2354 2263 2352 2288 2322 2354 2181 
Standard errors in parentheses  + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 Standard errors for area 
effects take account of correlation of errors across areas. 
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Table II: Binary Logistic Regressions of Weekly Attendance: UK 1993 
 Basic Secularisation Security Assimilation Integration Ethnic 
origins 
Full  
Woman -0.92*** -1.13*** -0.97*** -1.00*** -0.92** -0.89*** -1.03*** 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.19) (0.30) 
Partner 0.33 0.18 0.35 -0.09 0.25 0.31 -0.12 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.23) (0.22) (0.25) 
Age 0.01* 0.01 0.01+ -0.00 0.02 0.02* 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
No qualification   Ref.      Ref.  
Basic  -0.15     -0.15 
  (0.29)     (0.43) 
Secondary  0.27     0.25 
  (0.35)     (0.26) 
A level  -0.50     -0.50 
  (0.33)     (0.33) 
University  -0.08     0.16 
  (0.39)     (0.53) 
Fluent in English  -0.68**     -0.32+ 
  (0.25)     (0.18) 
Employed   -0.18    0.05 
   (0.23)    (0.28) 
2nd generation    -0.80*   -0.40 
    (0.32)   (0.29) 
Duration of stay    0.01   0.01 
    (0.02)   (0.01) 
British identity     0.27**  0.25*** 
     (0.09)  (0.07) 
Own ethnic identity     0.26*  0.23* 
     (0.12)  (0.10) 
No association      Ref.   Ref.  
Ethnic association     0.35  0.65* 
     (0.39)  (0.31) 
Majority association     -0.30  -0.22 
     (0.29)  (0.33) 
Own group area      0.02+  0.02*** 
     (0.01)  (0.01) 
Pakistani       Ref.  Ref.  
Bangladeshi      0.41+ 0.54 
      (0.22) (0.34) 
Indian / African Asian      -0.29 -0.14 
      (0.27) (0.40) 
Constant 0.45 1.25** 0.53+ 1.47*** -1.92** 0.35 -1.14 
 (0.28) (0.39) (0.30) (0.41) (0.70) (0.29) (0.71) 
pseudo R2 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.13 
Log likelihood -375 -345 -375 -359 -350 -373 -307 
N 944 877 944 917 895 944 808 
Standard errors in parentheses    + p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 All models are 
estimated applying design weights. Standard errors for area effects take account of correlations 
across area categories. 
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Appendix: Variable Descriptives   
 Netherlands UK* 
 N Mean / % N Mean / % 
Attendance 2399 47 944 67 
Women 2411 22 1028 49 
Partner 2406 71 1028 70 
Age (years) 2380 39 1028 36 
Educational qualifications 2358  1016  
     No qualifications   37  50 
     Basic  31  16 
     Secondary  21  14 
     A levels  7  9 
     University  5  11 
Fluent in Dutch / English 2371 33 968 45 
Employed 2414 50 1028 29 
2nd generation 2414 8 994 32 
Duration in country (years): for 1st generation 2125 17 752 19 
Dutch identity 2387 2   
Strength of British identity (score out of 5)   984 3.6 
Strength of own ethnic identity (score out of 5)   994 4.3 
Associational activity 2405  1022  
     No association  87  79 
     Ethnic group association  8  8 
     Majority association  5  12 
Group proportion in postcode (%) 2414 34 1028 14 
Ethnic group 2414  1028  
     Turkish  45   
     Moroccan  49   
     Surinamese / Antillean  6   
     Pakistani    64 
     Bangladeshi    21 
     Indian / African Asian    15 
Note: all are proportions (percentages) except age, duration and British and own ethnic identity. *UK 
statistics are weighted to adjust for design effects, but the Ns are unweighted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
